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Introduction  
Resistance is an important issue in the use of agricultural pesticides:  according to 
the National Audubon Society, in 1993, 504 insect species were known to be resistant to 
at least one formulation of pesticide, while one hundred and fifty fungi and other plant 
pathogens had developed resistance to fungicides (Cate and Tinkle, 1994).  As for weeds, 
212 herbicide resistant weed biotypes were reported to be in existence in 1998 (Heap, 
1998).   
An important recent event that has brought the issue of resistance management to 
the forefront of the policy debate has been the successful introduction of plants 
genetically engineered to produce pesticides.  The first generation of these products uses 
toxins produced by a bacterium, Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt).  The rapid expansion of these 
products poses important policy questions on how to utilize these new resources so that 
resistance buildup is limited.  For instance, according to the Third Biennial National 
Organic Farmers’ Survey conducted by the Organic Farming Research Foundation 
(OFRF, 1999), Bt sprays are the most important external input used by organic farmers 
for pest management.  Moreover, Bt sprays are used on over half of the US production of 
crops such as celery, cabbage and fresh tomatoes (USDA, 1999).  There is a concern that 
the heavy use of Bt toxins produced by the plant pesticides will cause resistance to 
develop, thereby depriving farmers of the possibility to use Bt sprays (EPA, 1998a).  In 
order to preserve susceptibility, the EPA has mandated the institution of resistance 
management plans.   
The rationale for such initiatives is that the use of pesticides poses an impure 
public goods problem: utilization jointly generates a (positive) private characteristic,   3  
which depends on the individual farmer’s use of the chemical, and a (negative) public 
characteristic, that is, the reduction in susceptibility.  Susceptibility tends to have a 
common property nature because the effect of each farmer’s use is minimal, therefore 
farmers ignore the impact that their actions have on resistance.  Moreover, pests are 
mobile, so first-best behavior today does not guarantee successful outcomes of the 
pesticide application in the future.  Though susceptibility is a scarce resource, resistance 
management plans that slow down resistance development are costly, and they can only 
reduce the impact of pesticide usage on resistance development and not eliminate it.  The 
value of resistance management must be weighted against the costs of developing 
alternative technologies:  if new active ingredients are regularly discovered and made 
available for commercialization, it might be socially optimal to devote more resources to 
research and development activities and let susceptibility to the existing active 
ingredients be mined rapidly.  Thus, society faces two simultaneous decisions in the use 
of pesticides:  how to allocate the existing stock of biological capital - susceptibility
1 – 
among farmers and through time, and how many resources to invest in the discovery of 
new agents effective against the pest.  
The object of this paper is to explicitly identify the public nature characteristics of 
susceptibility in a dynamic setting and to characterize the optimal intertemporal usage 
problem from a social planner perspective.  This allows us to discuss the two concomitant 
decisions outlined above.  First, we derive the optimal level of pesticide use, that is, we 
explicitly characterize the trade-off between present and future use of a pesticide, as 
research on new compounds goes on.   Secondly,  we characterize  the optimal amount of  
                                                            
1  See Hueth and Regev (1974) for a discussion of the concept of biological capital.   4  
resources to allocate to the development of new chemicals.  The decision of how many 
resources to devote to research efforts aimed at discovering new chemical compounds 
will depend on these activities’ relative costs and benefits.  These costs and benefits will 
in turn be a function of both stock and flow variables, such as the production costs of the 
chemicals, the level of susceptibility of the existing resource and the overall amount of 
effort already spent on research.   
We will focus here on research towards the discovery of novel technologies.   
Historically, novel pesticides have tended to combine lower toxicity for humans and 
alternative modes of actions, and have ranged from chemical modifiers of development 
and behavior (pheromones, growth regulators) to artificial analogues of natural elements, 
such as the chloronicotinyls (from nicotine) to insect-tolerant plants and genetically 
modified crops, like the Bacillus thuringiensis plant-pesticides (Pedigo, 1999). 
The seminal paper on resistance development, by Hueth and Regev (1974), 
focuses on resistance development within one season.  Taylor and Hadley (1975) develop 
an explicit genetic model of resistance inheritance, while later works, such as Regev et al. 
(1983), Lazarus and Dixon (1984), and Clark and Carlson (1990) analyze the possible 
problems deriving from the common property nature of pests.  While the pesticide 
literature has taken into account the effects of the externalities created by the use of 
pesticides, it has not integrated these considerations with the possibility of backstops.  On 
the other hand, an extensive amount of economics literature, spurred by the energy crisis 
of the early ‘70s, has analyzed the issues related to the use of a nonrenewable resource 
when the discovery of backstops is uncertain.  Dasgupta and Heal’s seminal paper (1974) 
studies the problem of optimal use when there is uncertainty on the date of discovery of   5  
the new, non-exhaustible technology (and not on its characteristics).  The probability of 
the discovery date is exogenous, and there are no investment efforts.  The authors prove 
that in certain circumstances the uncertainty is formally equivalent to an increase in the 
discount rate. Kamien and Schwartz (1978) and Dasgupta, Heal and Majumdar (1977) 
extend the model to endogenize the level of investment which accelerates the time of 
discovery of the new technology.   Davison uses essentially the same framework for the 
case in which the probability of discovering a backstop is a function of the flow of R&D 
and not its stock.  The model presented here will integrate common property 
considerations and the existence of technological progress in the determination of optimal 
use. 
A caveat is in order.  Susceptibility could be modeled both as a non-renewable 
and a renewable resource.  The choice impinges on the relative fitness of the resistant 
individuals compared to the susceptible ones.  Should there be a fitness cost for the 
resistant organisms, they would tend to disappear once the usage of the chemical 
selecting for them had been stopped.  Since the entomological literature reports various 
instances of lack of fitness costs
2, and the economic literature mentioned above assumes 
no fitness cost, we will model susceptibility as a non-renewable resource. 
In the next pages, we will develop a profit maximization model with heterogeneous 
farmers and we will apply some of the approaches developed in the energy literature to 
determine the optimal time path for the depletion of susceptibility to an existing pesticide 
and to discuss the characteristics of the discovery process.  We will assume that 
technological  change  is  endogenous  and  analyze  the dynamics of research in backstop  
                                                            
2 See for instance Andrews and Morrison (1997) Croft and Whalon (1983), Penrose (1990), and Romero 
and Sutton (1998).   6  
technologies in an uncertain world. 
 
The basic framework   
We assume that farmers are risk neutral profit maximizers who face a dichotomous 
choice in the use of the pesticide.  The rationale is that we are dealing with a pesticide 
such as Bt corn, where there is no dose issue.  Alternatively, this analysis can be applied 
to farmers that follow the recommended dose instruction to the letter.  As discussed in 
more detail below, farmers cannot use their past infestation as a predictor for the future 
and the development of resistance has a public good nature, thus each individual takes the 
existing stock of susceptibility E as given and his/her contribution to resistance 
development as negligible.  We will assume that farmers only choose whether to apply 
pesticide or not.  The motivation for this assumption is that farmers decide whether to 
apply the pesticide after they have determined the use of other inputs, such as the type of 
tillage and the amount of fertilizer
3.  This characterization allows us to focus on the 
optimal use of the pesticide and not on input substitution. 
We define treatment for farmer i as  1 i e = and no treatment as  0 i e = , with p as the 
price of the pesticide.  We assume that the marginal cost of production of the pesticide, χ, 
is constant, and the chemical industry is perfectly competitive
4, so that p = χ
5.  Without 
loss of generality, we normalize yield without pest damage to 1, and crop price to 1.  We 
parameterize the level of pest infestation each farmer i suffers from as  [, ] i θθ θ ∈ .  
                                                            
3 Alternatively, we could assume input separability. 
4 The chemical industry is also myopic in its behavior towards resistance, since E is a public good. 
5 This is a simplification in the case of patented pesticides, but it reflects reality for older chemicals.   7  
Specifically, , [0, ] ii n θθ ∈∈ !
6, so that at  i θ =0, the farmer suffers no damage, and at n he 
suffers the biggest damage among the farmers’ population, which has size n+1.  In 













−  .  We also assume 
that, in each period of time, the infestation level  i θ  is independent of the  i θ  of the 
previous period.  This indicates that the pest population is highly mobile.   
Therefore, if the farmer chooses  0 i e = , his profit will be given by: 
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If farmers use the pesticide, their profit is no longer a function of the severity of 
the infestation, but only of the level of susceptibility to the pesticide of the pest 
population.  This parameterization is equivalent to the assumption made by Hueth and 
Regev that the pesticide action is not density dependent.  The higher the level of 
susceptibility, the higher the profit.  We normalize the stock of susceptibility E to the    
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.  Therefore: 
 
 
                                                            
6 It would be possible to choose a more complex distribution that puts some mass at  i θ . This would not 
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When the efficacy of the pesticide is at its maximum, that is, when the pests are 
all susceptible, and E = 1, than  ( , 1) 1 iii ep πθ == − .  As E declines, so do the returns for 
the farmers using the pesticide, thus, while overuse of the pesticide persists, the absolute 
level of usage decreases with time as efficacy decreases.  The farmer’s maximization in 























































→ , using the 
pesticide will be worthwhile even if the level of susceptibility is low.  More specifically, 






= , it will always be 







> .  Increases in the pesticide price p, 
will decrease the number of farmers treating their crops, since if  01 : pp >  
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The stock of susceptibility to pesticides used until time t, denoted by E, is such 
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Where ω is the marginal impact of individual usage on resistance development.  
This characterization of the problem’s dynamics indicates that the increase in resistance 
taking place in each period affects only the future effectiveness of the pesticide.  This lag 
is due to the fact that resistance takes some time to spread. We can then see how farmers 
overuse the pesticide, as they do not take into account the impact of their use on 

















−− , where µ  represents the shadow price of susceptibility.  We will 
discuss the social optimum more explicitly next.   
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First scenario:  no substitutes to the pesticide 
We start by discussing the simplest case.  In this scenario, there are no alternatives 
to the pesticide, and resistance management is the only activity that can slow down the 
mining of susceptibility.  This is not necessarily a realistic scenario, since it assumes that 
no technological change is possible, but it is useful in setting the stage of the problem.   
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Assuming that n is large, so that the proportion of farmers not using the pesticide, 



























We can rearrange the maximand: 
 
                                                            
7 Note that this maximization indicates the lack of credit markets for both the government and individual 
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       +− + +       
         =− −    +    +− − −      
∫ .   (4) 
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The first order conditions are: 
 
()










−   + ∂   == − + + − + +    
     ∂ 
,      (5) 
()









−   +   =− + + + + −    
     










− ∂  =− =− −  ∂+ 
.        ( 7 )  
 
The transversality condition for E is: 0, and lim ( ) ( ) 0
t EE t t µ
→∞ ≥= .  As  0 E → , 
1 γ → .  If  0 χ > , the resource will not be extracted completely. 
  Equation (5) characterizes the optimal number of farms treating for infestations, at 
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, equal the marginal costs:  
rt pe µω
− + .  
Equation (7) illustrates how the shadow value of susceptibility decreases over time 
because the resource becomes less and less effective. 
PROPOSITION 1 – The proportion of farmers not using the pesticide increases over time 
if the discount rate is positive. 
PROOF: 
We take the derivative of (6) with respect to time, and equate it to (7): 
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, we can write: 
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. (8) 
 
This result implies that, if the discount rate is zero, the optimal policy is to have a 
constant percentage of farmers not using the pesticide.  The level of social welfare will 
however decrease over time as the efficacy of the pesticide declines.  If, on the other 






, as the term in brackets is positive.  This results illustrates that in 
the first best, resistance management plans will be used to slow down the mining of 
susceptibility.  We now analyze the more realistic case of an uncertain backstop.   
 
Third scenario: uncertain non-exhaustible substitutes 
In this scenario, the discovery a backstop technology is not certain, and the 
probability of developing a new (non-exhaustible) technology is endogenous, depending 
positively on the cumulative amount of R&D effort.  We suppose that the new 
technology is a real breakthrough, so that it renders the stock of susceptibility remaining 
at the time of the discovery worthless.  A good example would be the introduction of   14  
pest-tolerant plants.  In this case, no resistance develops to the new technology, so that 
we can consider the innovation renewable.  Define T as the time at which the new 
technology becomes available, and W as the maximum social welfare possible after the 
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As we said above, the probability of discovering a backstop technology is 
endogenous, and depends positively on the cumulative amount of R&D effort.  Define 
the level of R&D in each time period as I, and the cumulative level of R&D, or stock of 
knowledge capital, as K.  We will assume that the dynamic relationship between stock 
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We define the probability of discovering the backstop as  () K φ .   () K φ  is such 
that (0) 0 φ = , '(0) 0 φ = , ' 0 φ ≥ , and lim ( ) 1
z z φ
→∞ = .  This is the same structure of the R&D 
function specified in Kamien and Schwartz (1978).  The probability of discovering the 
new technology in the interval dt equals  ( ( )) '( ( )) ( ) '( ( )) ( ) dK t K tK t d t K tf I d t φφ φ
•
== .   15  
In their seminal 1974 paper, Dasgupta and Heal prove that if WE = 0, as we have 
assumed here, a certain kind of certainty equivalence results, so that the maximization 
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The optimal control problem has two control variables: 
n
γ
 and I, and two state 
variables, E and K.  In general terms, utilization of the pesticide shall cease in finite time 
at, say, T* since the susceptibility that makes it effective is nonrenewable.  The presence 
of uncertainty might modify the optimal T*, but, since the discovery of a backstop in the 
period [0, T*] cannot be guaranteed, it might be the case that the susceptibility of the 
pesticide is exhausted before an alternative technology is invented.  We define the social 
welfare function before the introduction of the backstop as: 
   16  
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The first order conditions are:  
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Equation (11) is the equivalent to equation (5) in the previous scenario:  at the 












−   +    −+ + + −     
      
, are equal to the marginal costs:   
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rt pK e µω φ
− +− .  The equalization of marginal costs and benefits determines the 
optimum level of investment as well, once I > 0, as shown in equation (13).  The cost of 
investment is represented by [] () '( ) 1 ( )
rt gI K e φ
− − , and the benefits by 
' ()' ( ) ' ( )
rt Kf I W e f I φη
− + .   
PROPOSITION 8 – The proportion of farmers not using the pesticide increases through 
time.   
PROOF: 
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  +       += − + + + + −                
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. (17) 
 
Note that the first term is identical to the expression on the RHS of equations (8) 







>0, since we can 
rewrite (17) as 
()
2
'( ) ( )









=     − +    
, and µ , the shadow value of 
susceptibility, is positive.  Also, note how the time path of the optimal fraction of farmers 
that treat for pest infestation depends on the structure of the uncertainty. 
 
PROPOSITION 9 – The level of investment increases through time.  The increase is 
higher if the discount rate is positive. 
PROOF: 
At t = 0, K = 0.  Therefore, either I(0) = 0 and 0 '(0) (0) '(0) gf η >− + , or I(0) > 0 
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time, and equate it to (14): 
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   +Γ     −    =  −   +−   −  
.   (18) 
 
It is interesting to note that Kamien and Schwartz’s 1978 paper has the R&D 
effort reach a peak and then decline.  The rationale for their result is that they consider an 
economy in which a stock of capital is used as the only research input and – in 
combination with the nonrenewable resource – in the production of the composite output 
which can be either consumed or saved to increase the capital stock.  As the 
nonrenewable resource is depleted, the economy loses its capacity to invest in R&D.  In 
the case examined here, however, the capacity of society to invest in R&D does not 
decrease with time, and it is socially optimal to increase the amount of resources invested 
in research for two concurrent reasons:  the effectiveness – and the value - of the old 




We have provided a rationale for the implementation of resistance management 
plans to prolong the effectiveness of pesticides.  However, we have not specified the   20  
mechanisms that might be used.  In particular, if there are asymmetries of information on 
important parameters, solutions in which farmers organize among themselves might be 
superior to command and control type of measures.  Alternatively, if the chemical 
industry has some degree of market power, it might be best to have the pesticide 
producers implement resistance management plans.  Miranowski  and Carlson (1986) 
give a complete overview of the various possible scenarios. 
The model developed above illustrates how there is a trade-off between devoting 
resources to R&D or to resistance management.  The more intensely we use existing 
pesticides, the more we should invest in the research of backstops.  The analysis 
presented here illustrates how this choice depends on a variety of factors.  Specifically, 
biological parameters such as the characteristics of the pest population, (from mobility to 
reproduction), the initial frequency of resistance genes and the rate of mutation are 
crucial elements of the dynamics of resistance development and of the value of 
susceptibility.  Economic and technological parameters determine the level of uncertainty 
and costs of developing and producing the new technology.  Other issues that have not 
been explicitly addressed are linked to the relative safety attributes of the old and new 
technologies – which might determine a faster phasing out of old pesticides, for example.  
Safety elements and the externalities created by pesticides are also linked to consumers’ 
willingness to pay for reduced pesticide use.  All these issues are part of the broader 
determination of the optimal level of pesticide use.   
The introduction of new pesticides in the US market has been relatively steady in 
the last decade (see EPA 1998b, 1998c, 1997, 1996, 1995, 1994).  However, this does not 
necessarily imply that susceptibility to existing pesticides is going to become obsolete.    21  
For example, over 10 percent of the 122 new pesticides registered in the US since 1994 
are Bt products, either in spray form or plant-pesticides.  Moreover, the EPA is in the 
process of approving or has already approved several new Bt-based bioengineered 
products:  nine out of the 12 experimental use permits that the EPA granted in the year 
2000 are for Bt toxins (EPA 2000).  As we noted above, the characteristics of the 
innovation process matter in determining how much effort to devote to resistance 
management.  If the pesticide industry and the EPA plan on relying heavily on Bt 
products in the future, some kind of resistance management is likely to be needed.   22  
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